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COUNTER-POINT
LEGALIZING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: A FOOLISH AND
DANGEROUS POLICY
MICHAEL J. LEECH*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Richard A. Epstein's extreme proposal to abolish
employment discrimination laws is misguided and unwise. Reasonable people may differ on questions such as the forms of discrimination that should be actionable, the proof required to establish a violation, the enforcement mechanisms to use and the remedies that should be available. Professor Epstein's proposal declares that courts should permit all forms of employment discrimination whenever and however practiced by private employers.
The proposal is foolish because it assumes that our racial and
other social problems will evaporate if they are ignored. It is dangerous because the likely consequence is increased social unrest
and racial divisiveness.
We need employment discrimination laws because employers
should make decisions that affect job opportunities and careers on
the basis of individual merit and business considerations and not
on the basis of skin color, sex, religion, age or disability. These
laws affirm that we are all God's creatures, none intrinsically better than any other. They represent the embodiment of the American ideal of human equality. Why should an employer be permitted to make decisions that have a profound effect on an individual's life on such an arbitrary basis? What countervailing social
benefit does such discrimination provide?
This Article responds to Professor Epstein's proposal to eliminate discrimination laws. Part I points out the real-life imbalance
in the American workplace and recalls the justification for these
laws at the time they were adopted. Parts II and III describe the
central problem of race relations in the United States: persistent
black poverty. Part IV points out and challenges the assumptions

* Mr. Leech is a partner of the Chicago-based law firm of Hinshaw &
Culbertson, and co-author of Holloway & Leech, Employment Termination: Rights
and Remedies (Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 2d ed. 1993). This Article is an adaptation
of a speech given by Mr. Leech at the conference entitled Handling the Difficult
Civil Rights Case in the '90s held at The John Marshall Law School on October 10,
1995.
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made by Professor Epstein in justifying his proposal and contrasts
them with social, economic and legal reality. Part V disputes Professor Epstein's version of how Title VII disparate impact standards and government contractor affirmative action requirements
work in real life. Part VI points out some of the problems with
these laws that require reform, but not repeal. Finally, this Article concludes by pointing out the historical failure and moral
bankruptcy of the discredited laissez-faire idealogy on which Professor Epstein's proposal is premised.
I.

EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND THE NEED FOR DISCRIMINATION LAWS

The general rule of employment at will' allows great flexibility to employers. The rule, however, results in economic dislocation of individuals, threatening their ability to meet financial commitments, causing emotional pain and sometimes ultimately affecting the stability of the employee's family. Professor Epstein
makes the unsupported assumption that employers and employees
are on an equal footing economically. 2 In the real world, most
fair-minded people will concede that this is not true.
Employers are constantly in the employment market, which
generally has a ready supply of workers to fill available jobs.
Employees make long term financial commitments such as mortgages, education expenses, car loans and, for that matter, families
themselves by relying on jobs that can be revoked at a moment's
notice. To meet their commitments, employees depend on their
jobs. Following termination, it can take months or years before
the employee finds a new comparable position. The power to discharge at will is in sharp contrast to almost every other industrialized nation in the world.3 Because we allow employers great
flexibility in deciding who and when to hire and fire, it is not too
much to ask that the employer's decision not be discriminatory.
Discrimination against racial minorities, against women,
against the religious, against older workers and against disabled
individuals are similar phenomena. Each form of discrimination

1. Michael A. DisSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Employer
May Discharge At-Will Employee for any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544, 551 (1982).
2. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 24-27 (1992).

3. See, e.g., Leslie Deak, Customary InternationalLabor Laws and Their Application in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
1, 4 (1994) (describing most European labor law systems as cooperative, rather
than adversarial); Erin E. Lynch, Late-Life Crisis: A Comparative Analysis of the
Social Insurance Schemes for Retirees of Japan, Germany, and the United States,
14 COMP. LAB. L.J. 339, 344 (1993) (noting Japan's distinctive labor system characterized by life-time employment, and noting Germany's labor system being devoted
to its workers and their ability to plan for the future through stable, long-term employment for an indefinite period).
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represents an abuse of an employer's power over the life of its
employees and each presents a distinct need for legal protection.
Congress adopted the first discrimination law, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 to curb the widespread discrimination
against African Americans. 5 The problem of employment discrimination against Black Americans is a logical focus for this discussion, recognizing that other classes subject to these laws present
somewhat different considerations.
To justify the retention of Title VII, one only need to consider
the rationale President Kennedy, who initially proposed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, offered for its adoption. His words remind us
that ending discrimination is part of a continuous struggle to live
up to ideals on which our nation was founded. What was true
thirty-three years ago is true today:
The Negro baby born in America today, regardless of the section of the Nation in which he is born, has about one-half as much
chance of completing high school as a white baby born in the same
place on the same day, one third as much chance of completing
college, one-third as much chance of becoming a professional man,
twice as much chance of becoming unemployed, about one-seventh
as much chance of earning $10,000 a year, a life expectancy which
is 7 years shorter, and the prospects of earning only half as much.
This is not a sectional issue. Difficulties over segregation and
discrimination exist in every city, in every State of the Union, producing in many cities a rising tide of discontent that threatens the
public safety. Nor is this a partisan issue. In a time of domestic
crisis men of good will and generosity should be able to unite regardless of party or politics. This is not even a legal or legislative
issue alone. It is better to settle these matters in the courts than on
the streets, and new laws are needed at every level, but law alone
cannot make men see right.
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as
the scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution.
The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be
afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether we are going
to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated. If an American ... cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us want, then
who among us would be content to have the color of his skin
changed and stand in his place? Who among us would then be content with the counsels of patience and delay?
One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the slaves, yet their heirs, their grandsons, are not fully
free. They are not yet freed from the bonds of injustice. They are

4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 257 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2000h-1 (1988)).
5. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2393; S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2362.
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not yet freed from social and economic oppression. And this Nation,
for all its hopes and all its boasts, will not be fully free until all its
citizens are free.
Those who do nothing are inviting shame as well as violence.
Those who act boldly are recognizing right as well as reality....
This is one country. It has become one country because all of us and

all the people who came here had an equal chance to develop their
talents.

We cannot say to 10 percent of the population that you can't
have that right; that your children can't have the chance to develop
whatever talents they have; that the only way that they are going
to get their rights is to go into the streets and demonstrate. I think
we owe them and we owe ourselves a better country than that.6
Professor Epstein wants to return to an era when the country
did nothing about discrimination. He does not propose reform to
limit perceived abuse or perversion of the non-discrimination
principle. 7 Instead, he advocates allowing private employers the
freedom to discriminate as blatantly as they wish,' contending
that the problem will evaporate if we ignore it.' This is wrong,
both morally and practically.
II. PERSISTENT BLACK POVERTY: A SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEM
Professor Epstein begins his analysis with basic principles of
free market economics. A better starting point for a discussion of
this question would consider the persistent social problem of poverty among African Americans. Months after Title VII became
effective, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had identified poverty as
the principal obstacle to racial equality. 0 He was in Memphis in
April 1968, to support a strike among sanitation workers to fight
against poverty when he was assassinated." Poverty has contributed to a climate of hopelessness and violence in African
American urban communities at least since the ghetto riots during the "long hot summer" of 1967.12

6. PUB. PAPERS, 1963, at 468-70.
7. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 2-3.
8. Id. at 9, 76-77, 495-96.
9. Id. at 59, 419. He also contends that whatever discrimination does persist
after it is legalized would be economically efficient and, therefore, best for society
as a whole. Id. at 77.
10. See, e.g., John H. Fenton, Dr. King, in Boston Common Rally, Warns
Against Nation of Onlookers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1965, at 1, 12 (quoting Dr. Mar-

tin Luther King Jr. as saying it would be irresponsible for him to deny the "crippling poverty and the injustice" exists in heavily black populated areas such as
Roxbury, in Boston).
11. Earl Caldwell, Guard Called Out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1968, at 1.
12. See, e.g., Maurice Carrol, Downtown Is Hit, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1967, at 1;
Looting Erupts in Chicago, But Police Limit Violence, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1967, at
19; More Were Killed and Jailed in Watts in '65 Than in Newark, N.Y. TIMES, July
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The statistical measures of economic status show with unremitting consistency that Black Americans continue to be socially
and economically disadvantaged according to almost every meaningful measurement. Households without a father represent 13.6%
of white families, but 46.7% of African American families.13
Blacks have a 13.4% chance of being arrested while whites only
have 3.1% chance. 14 Even though 82.9% of the country is white
and only 12.6% is black,' 5 the estimated prison population of the
United States includes 425,500 black inmates and 410,100 white
inmates. 6 African Americans also have a higher rate of being
victims of crimes. Most strikingly, the murder rate for white men
is 9.3 victims per hundred thousand persons but increases to 72
victims per hundred thousand persons for black men. 17
The gap in household income between whites and blacks has
remained consistent since 1967, with both black and white income
levels varying with changes in economic conditions but not in
relation to one another. The unemployment rate for African Americans is 12.9% as compared to 6% for whites.' 8 Since 1971, the
rate of completion of high school among black students has steadily increased, making the disparity between white and black rates
less than one-third of the rates in 1971.19 The 30% gap between
the rates of employment for recent white and black high school
graduates, however, has not shown a concomitant narrowing.0
While 12.5% of white households have an income below $10,000,
30.5% of black households fall below this amount. 2' At the other
end of the spectrum, household income exceeds $100,000 for 5.3%
of white households but only for 1.5% of black households. 22 Persons living below the government's poverty line represent 11% of
whites and 33.3% of blacks.23 The gap between white and black
median household income (inflation-adjusted) has gradually widened from $12,500 in 1967 to about $18,000 today.24

14, 1967, at 1; Negroes in Detroit Defy Curfew and Loot Wide Area, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 1967, at 1.
13. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 48
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 STATISTICS].
14. Id. at 205.
15. Id. at 13.
16. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 46 (1992).

17. 1994 STATISTICS, supra note 13, at 201.
18. Id. at 396.

19. Christopher Farrell, Is Black ProgressSet to Stall?, BUS. WK., Nov. 6, 1995,
at 68.
20. Id. at 72.
21. 1994 STATISTICS, supra note 13, at 467.
22. Id.

23. Id. at 48.
24. Farrell, supra note 19, at 72.
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African Americans also lag behind whites in professional

employment. Twenty-two percent of whites hold a four year college degree, while only 12.2% of blacks do.25 Rather than representing a proportionate 12.6% of the physicians in the country,
only 3.7% of the physicians and 3.7% of the professional engineers
are African Americans.26 The legal profession is no different: only 2.7% of the attorneys and 2.8% of the federal judges in the
United States are African Americans.
These statistics are a reminder that many African Americans
live in a world quite different from the one most of us inhabit.
What these racial comparisons do not show, is that significant disparities now exist among African Americans. A significant percentage of African Americans are finding their way into the middle class. The percentage of African Americans who completed
college increased from 11% to 16% between 1971 and 1983, although no substantial increase has occurred in the last decade.2"
Across a broad range of white collar and professional positions,
the rate of increase in employment of African Americans has actually been higher than for whites over the past five years. The
wealthiest 20% of African American households are, on average,
now equal to the national average.29 Signs of upward mobility
among the educated African Americans are evident in the following statistics:
Blacks in Selected Professions, 1950-1990
4
195030 196031 197032 19803' 19903
Physicians 1.7%
N/A
2.1%
2.8%
3.7%
Attorneys
1.4%
1.4%
1.3%
2.8%
N/A
25. 1994 STATISTICS, supra note 13, at 157.
26. Id. at 407.
27. Id.

28. Farrell, supra note 19, at 68.
29. Id. at 72.
30.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, INDUSTRIAL CHARACTERISTICS 1-17 (1950) (basing

the numbers on the following categories: Medical and Other Health Services; Legal
Services; Engineering and Architectural Services; and Miscellaneous Professional
and Related Services).

31.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

507, 513 (1960)

(basing statistics on "white males" and "non-white males" and using the category
Lawyers and Judges). Accurate percentages could not be obtained for minority physicians in 1960 data, or attorneys in 1990, due to incompatible classification methods. Id.
32. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 593, 596 (1970).
33. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, OCCUPATION BY INDUSTRY 1 (1980) (basing the
statistics on the following categories: Lawyers and Judges and Health Diagnosing
Occupations).
34.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BLACK POPULATION 185

(1990) (using Health Diagnosing Occupations as a classification); BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

392 (1990).
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Engineers
Managers

.01%
1.5%

1.4%
1.5%

1.2%
1.9%

2.5%
4.0%

10.9%
7.6%

The point of this statistical presentation is not to blame
white Americans for the deplorable conditions in which many
black Americans live. The statistics simply describe a state of affairs that confronts society. A variety of causes exist for this condition. At least one of the causes is a heritage of racism: black
slavery until 1865; legal segregation in the South until the 1960's
and de facto segregation elsewhere that continues today in most
housing markets; and a consensus among whites that blacks were
intellectually inferior that lasted until the mid-twentieth century
(and to which many quietly cling today). Many would say continued racist attitudes by whites are a principal cause of black poverty today. However, it is enough here simply to acknowledge that
a long history of racial economic disadvantage is at least one significant cause of continued black poverty.
The statistics are consistent with a hypothesis that social
programs and laws adopted in the 1960's had some salutary impact on the economic condition of some African Americans. Not
everyone will agree about the positive or negative impact of programs, such as changes in income tax structures, food stamps and
Medicaid. Many criticize such programs as ultimately ineffective
because they spawn dependency.
But Title VII is not properly subject to this criticism because
it clearly states a principle of non-discrimination that mandates
equality and not preference. Title VII has likely contributed to a
significant improvement in the life of at least a percentage of
African Americans. Professor Epstein acknowledges that Title VII
had an impact on employment of minorities in the first several
years after its adoption.35 His theory rests on the notion that
this impact resulted from the overturning of Jim Crow laws.36
He contends that since the mid-1960s, Title VII has been unnecessary and counterproductive. 37 However, this is just his assumption. He does not demonstrate that the other economic conditions
affecting black people and weak enforcement of the statute are not
to blame for the slow economic progress of African Americans.
Moreover, he does not demonstrate that the gains resulting from
Title VII would survive if it was repealed.
The persistence of black poverty in the face of employment
discrimination laws and social programs is troubling. We are
tempted to throw up our hands and say that our efforts to relieve
African American poverty have failed. But we cannot ignore the

35. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 243-46, 248, 251-54.
36. Id. at 245-46, 248, 251-54.
37. Id. at 260-63, 266.
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reality we see on our city streets and evening news programs. Our
society as a whole suffers from the condition in which many of its
citizens find themselves. Young people in the black urban ghetto
see life as a choice between a dead-end job flipping burgers at
minimum wage and earning a good, if dangerous, living in the
business of drug trafficking. The predictable response to this
choice in turn makes society significantly more dangerous and less
stable for those of all races who work for a living, pay taxes and
expect to live in a society with a reasonable level of safety.
III.

THE DAILY REALITY OF RACISM FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS

Those who, like me, have been raised and have lived their
lives in a middle class white society have difficulty comprehending
the impact racism has on the daily life of African Americans. The
stereotype of blacks as "dishonest" means that whenever money or
property is missing, suspicion immediately falls on you. It means
you are consistently asked for identification when trying to cash a
check or followed around a store by a detective when shopping.
Your success is not a personal triumph. Instead, you are congratulated as "a credit to your race." Taxicabs will not stop to pick you
up. Instead of explaining to your children that the word "nigger"
is a cruel word that should not be used, you must console your
child when she has been the target of this racial epithet. These
indignities, and many others, constantly remind blacks that they
are defined first by their race and only second as human beings.
Every few months a new public event reminds us that racism
still exists and then quickly fades from our consciousness. Most of
the events seem to occur in the criminal justice system, reflecting
our fear of the violence nourished by poverty. White criminals in
Boston18 and South Carolina 39 divert suspicion from themselves
by claiming that imaginary African Americans are responsible for
horrible crimes that whites actually committed against their loved
ones. Our first reaction is, "Oh, yes, of course that's what must
have happened." Rodney King is brutally beaten by police officers,4" but we know that without the videotape we would have

38. See, e.g., Constance L. Hays, Obsession in Boston: Mystery of Couple's
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1990, at 10 (describing how easily a white man convinced the city of Boston that a black man had shot his wife, though he was the
murderer).
39. See, e.g., Don Terry, A Woman's False Accusation Pains Many Blacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at 32 (reporting how Susan Smith, who drowned her two
children, convinced the nation that a black man had kidnapped them).
40. See, e.g., Robert Reinhold, Violence and Racism are Routine in Los Angeles
Police, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1991, at Al (explaining how the videotaped beating of black motorist Rodney King by white police officers sparked national outrage).
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dismissed the claim as an unreliable, self-serving accusation by a
petty criminal. We recoil in shock to hear Mark Fuhrman making
repeated and vicious racial slurs.4 1 To our amazement, African
Americans readily accepted a theory that white police officers
42
planted false evidence to make a case against O.J. Simpson.
These events and experiences illustrate the concrete harm of
racism, both to its direct victims and to the national state of
mind. These events, however, do not begin to capture the impact
of a childhood spent in ghetto poverty. Recent popular films depicting life in the urban ghetto provide some illustration. Imagine
being a child and trying to study when your classmates trash you
for being a good student 43 or trying to study when police helicopters flash lights from the sky into your neighborhood and the constant threat of a drive by shooting lingers in the air." Imagine
waking up as a ten year old in the middle of the night listening to
your alcoholic father throw dishes and abuse your mother while
screaming about indignities inflicted by a white man. 45 Imagine
that your only hope of escaping to create a successful life is the
foolish hope that you can steal money from a drug dealer and
disappear.4 6 Few white attorneys can count these sorts of events
as a part of their formative experiences in life. Certainly not me.
Society has a responsibility to acknowledge these harsh realities and to assist in remedying the tragic reality of urban black
poverty. Incredibly, Professor Epstein never even mentions these
realities and their effect on individuals in his book advocating the
repeal of employment discrimination laws. While everyone has
barriers and problems to overcome, those that I have faced pale in
comparison to those faced by African American youngsters growing up on the west side of Chicago. Those who would deregulate
the American economy generally suggest that people living in
such circumstances should "pull themself up by their own bootstraps." Without some assurance that every employer has a legal
obligation not to discriminate on the basis of race, what is the
point in trying? Professor Epstein asks these prospective employ-

41. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Noble, Ex-Detective's Tapes Fan Racial Tension in Los
Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1995, at A18 (discussing how the taped racist comments of Detective Mark Fuhrman exposed deep racial divisions within Los Angeles and its Police Department).
42. See, e.g., Martin Gottlieb, Racial Split at the End, as at the Start, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al (reporting how reactions to the O.J. Simpson verdict
were shaped largely by race).
43. See generally HIGHER LEARNING (Columbia Pictures 1994) (depicting life as
an African American college student on a California campus).
44. See generally BOYz IN THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991) (depicting the
environment of high school students in South Central Los Angeles).
45. See, e.g., STRAIGHT OUT OF BROOKLYN (Samuel Goldwyn 1991).
46. Id.
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ees to accept a world where the law will permit employers to reject them on the basis of nothing but their race.
It is in our collective self-interest to change the persistent
pattern of poverty among the African Americans. Imagine for a
moment the improvement in your own life that would result if
existing racial tensions and fears were eliminated. Simply doing
nothing to reduce discrimination will not accomplish that improvement. Employment discrimination laws, which help provide
black Americans with an opportunity to enter and progress in the
work force, are one reasonable step in that direction. Whatever
the critique of other social programs might be, requiring that the
road of employment be open to everyone, whether the employer is
private or public, is a sound element of any plan to change the
current pattern of poverty.
IV. PROFESSOR EPSTEIN'S UNSUPPORTED ASSUMPTIONS
Professor Epstein makes three central points, each founded
on unsupported assumptions. First, he believes that the improvement in employment levels of minority employees immediately
following the passage of Title VII represented only the effect of
eliminating the Jim Crow laws that mandated segregation. 7
Second, he contends that the market, left to its own devices, will
drive discriminators out of business.4 8 Third, he asserts that the
coercive power of a majoritarian government will more likely
create discriminatory conditions than an entirely free market. 9
A. Elimination of Jim Crow Laws Alone Did Not Cause the
Improvement in Employment Levels for Minorities
The dubious assertion that the elimination of legal barriers to
employment represented the basis for improvement of black employment following the passage of Title VII can be tested empirically. A state by state review of the improvement of black employment levels from 1960 to 1970 reveals that substantial increases
in employment for minority employees also occurred outside the
dozen or so states5 ° that had legal segregation. 5 1 In reality, seg-

47. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 245-46, 248, 251-54.
48. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 59, 419.
49. Id. at 94-95.
50. The states that mandated segregation were former slave states located in
the South. See H.R. Rep. No. 904, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1963
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1510 (describing primary locations of desegregation activity in
education since 1954 and listing Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas as having segregated school facilities).
51. In Minnesota, for example, unemployment levels among minorities in 1960
were approximately 12.8%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MINNESOTA, CHARACTERISTICS

1996]

Debating Employment DiscriminationLaws

regation and discrimination existed throughout the country and
not just in the South.
In the North, laws did not mandate segregation, but it nevertheless existed. For example, although the state did not legally
mandate segregation or discrimination in the work place during
the 1950's and 1960's, management at the paper mill in Luke,
Maryland, systematically excluded blacks from consideration in
certain categories of positions. Management based this exclusion
on the assumption that blacks were incapable of performing in
those jobs. Once management gave blacks the opportunity, they
proved that assumption wrong.12 It was the destruction of barriers to employment, imposed not so much by law as by custom,
tradition and stereotype, that explains the immediate impact of
Title VII which Professor Epstein acknowledges.
B. The Market On Its Own Will Not Drive Discriminatory
Employers Out Of the Market
Professor Epstein theorizes that market forces will drive
employers who discriminate out of business."' He proclaims that
skilled minority employees will gravitate to employers who do not
discriminate.5 4 This gravitation will allow those employers to
obtain a competitive advantage over discriminators. 5 These discriminators will have a less capable work force because they must
select from a smaller pool of capable employees.56 This strategic
advantage will then drive the discriminators out of business as

OF THE POPULATION 394-95 (1960). By 1970, however, minority unemployment
rates were only at 5.4%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MINNESOTA, CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE POPULATION 590 (1970).

In Wisconsin, unemployment levels for minorities in 1960 were approximately
11.4%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, WISCONSIN, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

358-59 (1960). By 1970, the unemployment levels of minorities had dropped to
8.3%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, WISCONSIN, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

594 (1970).
In Nevada, minority unemployment levels in 1960 were approximately 10.1%.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, NEVADA, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 64 (1960).

By 1970, the minority unemployment level had fallen to 5.4%. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, NEVADA, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 276 (1970).

In New Hampshire, the 1960 minority unemployment level was 10.2%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, NEW HAMPSHIRE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 64

(1960). By 1970, the minority unemployment level had dropped to 5.9%. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, NEW HAMPSHIRE, CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE POPULATION 301

(1970).
52. My father worked as a chemical engineer in that paper mill from 1951 to
1962.
53. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 38, 43.
54. Id. at 31-32.
55. Id. at 34-35.
56. Id. at 35-36.
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the more capable work forces of non-discriminating employers will
be more efficient.5 7 Professor Epstein is not troubled by the fact
that by the laws of supply and demand, the compensation of minority workers in this hypothetical world will necessarily be lower
than that of white workers as a result.
Curiously, no one has ever observed Professor Epstein's dynamic at work. Nothing in Title VII would prevent such a sequence of events from occurring. Yet, despite keen interest in the
causes of business success and failure, no report of any business
bankruptcy or downsizing anywhere in the American economy has
yet been attributed to this phenomenon. If this theory bore any
resemblance to real life, discrimination in employment would have
been unheard of outside the South before the passage of Title VII
since most of the country did not have laws that mandated discrimination or segregation in employment.
Nor can Professor Epstein attribute the absence of any proof
to support his theory of collective bargaining and union discrimination in the North. Under the National Labor Relations Act,s s
collective bargaining agreements may not impose limitations on
employer hiring and unions have no direct legal say in employer
hiring decisions.5" Moreover, until the late 1930's, American unions were generally weak, s0 and even in 1953, at the zenith of
their power, unions never controlled more than 35% of private
sector American jobs." l
The selection of employees is a highly unscientific process
and involves much guesswork. Every employer has stories of employees who appeared wonderful on paper but proved to be disastrous, and others hired with trepidation and only due to unusual
circumstances who proved to be outstanding. While businesses
attempt to hire the most capable employees, hiring decisions have
a large margin of error. A discriminatory business whose choices
are intuitively superior will continue to thrive even if its pool of
recruits is reduced by thirteen percent.
In order for Professor Epstein's model to operate, significant
differences need to exist between the skills of employees for each
position that would accumulate over the entire organization. In
fact, in today's world, most employers have a plethora of appli-

57. Id. at 37-38, 41-43.
58. July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449.
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(c)-(d) (1988).
60. Stephen W. Sears, Shut the Goddam Plant: The Great Sit-Down Strike that
Transformed American Industry, 33 AM. HERITAGE 3, 49-50 (1982).
61.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 232,

t.278 (1957). Between the years 1940 and 1950, labor unions barely controlled 20%
of the labor force. Id. Between the years 1955 and 1960, labor unions had an average of 24.1% control over the labor force. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 241, t.319 (1962).
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cants from whom to choose in almost any job. The differences
between the applicants at a given salary level is typically not
great. Thus, the overall impact of eliminating thirteen percent of
the potential applicant pool would simply reduce the number of
applications to process. The differences between employees are not
great enough to impact the bottom line. Moreover, when an employee performs poorly, his or her supervisor will typically adjust
how the work is performed to compensate for it. As much as employees hate to believe it, no one is indispensable.
Businesses suffer and die most often because they are unable,
or their managements are unwilling, to respond to externalities.
Changes in the cost of money, entry of new competitors, changes
in the market, shifts in public taste and technological innovations
drive companies out of business. By the same token, success in
the business world is sometimes nothing more than the result of
inertia. The company with a significant market position has the
established relationships and expertise to maintain that position
despite numerous foolish steps. Thus, the rise or fall of a company
involves much more than its hiring practices.
C. A Free Market is as Good a Vehicle for Discriminationas a
MajoritarianGovernment
Professor Epstein claims that governments, being controlled
by simple majorities, are more susceptible to outside pressures to
impose coercive requirements based on race than markets. 2
When a fifty-one percent majority approves of discrimination, he
claims it will impose this requirement on everyone in the marketplace by legal coercion.63 Markets, by contrast, operate on a
case by case basis. If fifty-one percent of the firms believe in discrimination, then forty-nine percent of the firms will not discriminate.' Thus, he concludes that the market is a better mechanism to fight discrimination than a political system."
When James Madison designed the constitutional system, he
had decades of real life experience with legislators. 6 He knew it

62. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, 94-95, 97, 266.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. This theory leaves to one side the question of whether those who own
firms hold the same views or attitudes as the population at large in a society, such
as the United States, having drastic inequalities of wealth. Farrell, supra note 19,
at 72. This disparity in wealth is nowhere more evident than in the case of African
Americans. Id. In 1993, the median net worth of all U.S. households was $45,700.

Id. The median net worth of Black households was $4400, less than 10% of the figure for all households. Id.
66.

ROBERT A. RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON AND THE SEARCH FOR NATIONHOOD

xv-xviii (1981). In 1776, Madison was a delegate to the Virginia Convention. Id. at
xv. In 1780, he was a delegate to the Continental Congress. Id. In 1784, he held a
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was inevitable that pressure groups, predominately economic
interests, would consistently appeal to legislatures for special
treatment and benefits.67 To control this phenomenon, Madison
deliberately designed a government that acts slowly.6" He used
devices such as a bicameral legislature,' 9 a strong executive
branch,7" a staggering of electoral terms from two to six years, 71
an independent judiciary with life tenure7 2 and a specific Bill of
Rights,73 to ensure that government could not efficiently initiate
laws to satisfy the whim of the majority.
These restrictions have helped to slow majorities from imposing their will on a vocal and organized minority. For example, a
large majority of Americans for twenty years has favored restrictions on the sale of handguns. 74 That majority, however, has only
a recent ban on assault weapons 75 and a waiting period 76 to
show for its efforts. To say that majorities have the capacity to
impose coercion on minorities easily through government forgets
the wisdom of the founding fathers.
Moreover, firms in a free market will not readily resist the
will of a majority, or even a committed minority, that favors segregation or discrimination. Consider the example of a drug store
in a small town in a border state without Jim Crow laws in the
1950's.77 The store's profit margin depended on the patronage of

seat in the Virginia House of Delegates. Id. In 1787, he was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. Id. at xvi.
67. ROBERT A. RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON THE FOUNDING FATHER 6-7 (1987). As

an experienced statesman, Madison knew the significant political pressures imposed upon the legislatures by economic and agricultural interests. Id. Madison
soon realized that the new nation would see a great deal of bargaining for favorable laws. Id.
68. Id. at 15-21. Madison is often credited with establishing a semblance of
order at the Constitution Convention. Id. In fact, Madison was thought to have
"writ[ten] the Constitution." Id. at 17.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
2.
70. U.S. CONST. art. II.

71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.1; § 3, cl.1.
72. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
73. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.

74. Since 1972, Roper polls have shown support between 69% (1980) and 81%
(1991, 1993) for a law requiring a police permit for gun ownership. SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 206, table 2.63 (1993).
75. Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1996 (1994).
76. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993).
77. This drug store existed in Piedmont, West Virginia. West Virginia did not
have any Jim Crow laws. The movie theater and municipal swimming pool in
Piedmont were segregated, too. I lived there as a child. As it happens, so did Harry
Lewis Gates, Jr., who became a Harvard Professor. Although he was only a year or
so older than I, we never met despite the small size of the "Tri-Towns" spanning
the Potomac River (about 5000 people total). Harry Lewis Gates, Jr. is black and
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its white customers, who included a significant percentage (not a
majority) of racists. The business had significant fixed costs for
real estate, minimum inventory and labor. A ten percent drop in
sales would have wiped out its profit margin. Rather than risk the
loss of some white customers, the business set aside a separate
part of the store to serve blacks and barred them from the shopping area for whites. This segregation made economic sense, but it
responded to the racist preference of a minority of the customers. v" In other words, the will of a minority through the market
forced segregation among races. Thus, Professor Epstein's theory
about the effect of a majoritarian government, like his other theories, represent a logical model divorced from reality, and thus
lacks any persuasive power.
V. THE REALITY OF THE OPERATION OF TITLE

VII

Professor Epstein's critique of the employment discrimination
laws demonstrates a lack of familiarity with how Title VII actually operates in the federal courts. This misunderstanding leads him
to repeat the widely circulated falsehood that Title VII and federal
contractor affirmative action rules effectively mandate racial favoritism.79 Professor Epstein does not criticize the federal courts'
use of uncertain and expensive inquiries into motive as the basis
for deciding individual Title VII claims. He does not acknowledge
the important positive effect of employment discrimination laws
that is limited under current law. Surprisingly, he offers no significant critique of the costly and usually pointless administrative
investigation stage in individual employment discrimination cases.
Professor Epstein asserts that it is just "too easy" for plaintiffs to prevail in disparate impact cases, which he says disregard
the risk that discrimination will be found where none exists. 80
He contends that federal contractors must give racial preferences
to minorities under the guise of affirmative action.8 1 Both state-

he wrote a memoir about the segregation and the arrival of integration entitled
Colored People. HARRY LEWIS GATES, JR., COLORED PEOPLE: A MEMOIR (1994).

During the 1950's, the world he inhabited and mine, although geographically identical, could just as well have been continents apart. Legal coercion had nothing to
do with it. The segregation was a matter of custom and accepted as a part of life at
the time. Not surprisingly, I find nothing convincing in Professor Epstein's theory

that markets will cure racism and government cannot. I have seen it work the
other way around.
78. A store like this may also exist in the black part of town that serves only

the nearby black clientele because whites rarely stray into the neighborhood. Since
all of that store's customers are black and also less affluent, the better goods that
can be found in the segregated drug store are not available anywhere else in town.
79. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 183, 206-12, 234-36.
80. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 206, 223-25.
81. Id. at 434-35.
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ments are incorrect, despite the wide circulation such charges
have been give.
A. "Affirmative Action" Does Not Mean, or Even Allow, Reverse
Discrimination
Employers who are federal contractors governed by Executive
Order 1124682 are not required or even permitted to give
preferences under present law. As used in the Order, "Affirmative
Action" is not racial favoritism. Affirmative Action consists of
examining each stage of the employment relationship, determining whether signs of discrimination exist and eliminating the discriminatory practices.8 3 This examination includes performing
statistical analyses as a diagnostic tool. No court, however, has
ever required an employer to apply standards or measures of
analysis more favorable to minorities than those applied under
Title VII that are described below.84 That standard is exceedingly generous to the employer.
If the employer's statistical analysis of its employment practices shows that minorities are being treated less favorably overall, the Order does not call for favoritism towards minorities.85
Where a disparity is shown, the Order requires setting "goals" in
keeping with employee turnover,8 8 directs the employer to examine its processes to identify and eliminate discriminatory practices
and insists that employers consider the qualifications of minority

82. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339, 342 (1965-1969).
83. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339, 342 (1965-1969). Contractors having
over 50 employees, with contracts over $50,000 or serving in certain financial capacities are required to develop Affirmative Action Plans. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a).
The plan must include "a set of specific and result-oriented procedures to which
the contractor commits itself to apply every good faith effort" and having the objective of attaining equal employment opportunity. It must include "an analysis of
areas in which the contractor is deficient in the utilization of minority groups and
women, and further, goals and timetables to which the contractor's good faith efforts must be directed." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10. All major job groups at a facility are
to be analyzed. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.12(a), (e), (f). Suggested steps include dissemination of the policy of equal employment opportunity, involvement with local organizations, auditing programs and processes to remove impediments, communication
with management employees, review of qualifications or minority employees and
women to ensure that they are given full opportunities, career counseling for all
employees and evaluation of supervisory performance for equal employment opportunity efforts. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.21-2.22.
84. Exec. Order Nos. 640a2 (Jan. 20, 1987) and 640a5 (Feb. 23, 1987); 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-2.11(b); Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co. v. Marshall, 507 F. Supp.
1330, 1337-38 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
85. ' The purpose of a contractor's establishment and use of goals is to ensure
that it meets its affirmative action obligation. It is not intended and should not be
used to discriminate against any applicant or individual because of race .... 41
C.F.R. § 60-2.30.
86. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(f).
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candidates.8 7 The Order expressly stipulates that the employer
has not committed a violation so long as it makes a "good faith
effort" to achieve these goals. 8 No court has ever held that this
"good faith effort" requires, or even allows, favoritism towards
minority candidates.8 9 Nor has any court ever sanctioned an employer simply on a showing that an employer did not meet the
goals.90 "Affirmative Action," as used in the Order, means action
to ensure that an employer does not use discrimination in employment decisions.91 Under the Executive Order, the courts rarely
award retrospective relief or debarment, which eliminates any
genuine risk to an employer who makes a meaningful effort to
prevent discrimination. 92
B.

Application of the DisparateImpact Test by Courts

Contrary to Professor Epstein's theory of disparate impact,
courts do not make statistical comparisons under Title VII between workforces and the local population.9 3 Rather, courts make
the comparisons on a position by position basis.94 They compare
the employer's rate of applicant selection in the relevant labor
markets 95 to the percentage of qualified persons available for

87. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.22(b)(5).
88. "Each contractor's compliance posture shall be reviewed and determined by
reviewing the contents of its programs, the extent of its adherence to the programs
and its good faith efforts to make its program work towards the realization of the
program's goals within the timetable set for completion." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.15.
89. "No contractor's status shall be judged alone by whether or not it reaches its
goals or meets its timetables." Id.
90. See Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co. v. Marshall, 507 F. Supp. 1330,
1337-38 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
91. The operative clause inserted into federal contracts reads: "The contractor
will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of
race. ...The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are
employed, and that employees are treated, without regard to their race .... "
92. See, e.g., First Alabama Bank of Montgomery v. Donovan, 692 F.2d 714, 722
(11th Cir. 1982) (refusing debarment because its purpose is to encourage compliance, not punish non-compliance); OFCCP v. Disposable Safety Wear, 59 FEP
Cases 1597, 1603 (Sec'y of Labor 1992) (overturning AIJ decision refusing
sanctions based on four-year delay in complying with requirements of conciliation
agreement).
93. New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585-86 (1979);
Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 1987); O'Neal v.
Riceland Foods, 684 F.2d 577, 586 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083
(1983); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 104 (5th Cir. 1976).
94. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977);
Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647 (1989); Cox v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 217, 226 (7th Cir. 1989).
95. This selection does not include its overall work force, which may, depending
on turnover or contraction, reflect a pattern of hiring over a period that can be
decades long.
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that position.96 The only statistics representing the availability
of qualified persons are reports showing the percentage of persons
already occupying such positions.97 As a result, the calculation
does not include qualified persons not presently occupying their
position, who are disproportionately African American in most instances. 98 In a time when the percentage of minority candidates
being educated or trained for a position is increasing, additional
statistical bias against a finding of discrimination will exist because the statistical undercounting will assume that those persons
are not part of the pool of qualified minorities. In short, the employer need not worry about the possibility of a disparate impact
suit outside of nonskilled entry level positions unless the employer
selects minority candidates at a lower rate than other employers
in the area. Under this test, a court would not have found any car
dealer in Alabama in 1950 guilty of discrimination in the hiring of
sales managers. The statistics would have shown that no qualified
black candidates existed because no other car dealer employed
any black sales mangers.
A statistical discrepancy is only the beginning of the analysis,
it is not enough to create a violation. Such discrepancies could
occur by the random operation of chance. The disparities observed
must be substantial and persistent over time. Many courts insist
that the probability of chance be eliminated to a level of mathematical certitude by a binomial distribution test of statistical
probability. 99 Unless the possibility that random chance could
explain the statistical disparity is less than five to ten percent,
the courts will not find discrimination.'00 This means that no
case involving a small number of employees can ever satisfy the
legal standard because, without a sample of around thirty, proof
that random chance is not operating is mathematically impossible. 1O' This rule also means that a discriminatory impact must
be proven, in effect, beyond a reasonable doubt and not simply by
a preponderance of the evidence.
Even this dramatic statistical disparity may not be sufficient
to make out a Title VII violation. The employer may offer nondis-

96. See, e.g., Movement For Opportunity & Equality v. General Motors Corp.,
622 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1980).
97. BARBARA LINDERMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1358 n.262 (2d ed. 1983).

98. Id.
99. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 483 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1977); Mister
v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 832 F.2d 1427, 1436 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1234 (1988).
100. Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 540 (5th Cir. 1982); Boggs v.
Bancroft-Whitney Corp., 25 FEP cases 13, 15 (C.D. Cal. 1981). See Cox v. City of
Chicago, 868 F.2d 217, 220 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989).
101. E.g., Dendy v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 431 F. Supp. 873, 876 (D. D.C. 1977).
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2
criminatory explanations for the dramatic disparity" or may
critique the validity of the statistical analysis without offering
anything at all in response.'0 3 Unless statistical proof is compelling and analytically proper in its entirety, courts reject it as
having no probative value.0 4 Analyses that show substantial
disparities may be attacked for focusing on specific categories and
05
ignoring others and rejected on that basis alone."
If possible, the claimant must tie the statistical disparity
directly to a specific employment practice, such as a test or other
Thus, cases cannot generally be proven by
selection device.'
simply examining statistics of, for example, all hires in a position.
They must focus on an employment practice, such as a test or
other screening device, and show that it has caused disparity. If
the employer uses more than one screening device, each device
must be analyzed separately.0 7 This requirement complicates
proof in these cases; it may preclude Title VII liability where the
specific practice to blame for the disparity cannot be readily identified.

C. Effect of the "DisparateImpact" Test On PrivateEnforcement
The result of this tremendous level of complexity applied to
disparate impact cases by the federal courts has been to virtually
eliminate private enforcement of disparate impact standards.
Before suit, the plaintiff has no access to the statistical data needed to determine whether a case exists. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 exposes attorneys who pursue such cases without having
a factual basis to substantial sanctions. The probability that some
methodological error will be found and lead to the rejection of the
case, along with the high cost required for the statistical studies,
has eliminated the use of this theory by all but a small percentage
of private practitioners. Where a plaintiff could prove a case, a
court can throw out the case simply because the court finds some
weakness or unique aspect of the individual representative
plaintiffs case that renders him or her an "inadequate" class representative. 0 8 Thus, the idea that employers must prefer minor-

102. Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 672-74 (4th Cir. 1984).
103. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1986),
affid, 839 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3154 (1989); EEOC v.
General Tel. Co. of Northwest Inc., 885 F.2d 575, 582 (9th Cir. 1989).
104. E.g., EEOC v. Lacy Baltimore Foods, Inc. 643 F. Supp. 406, 411 (D. Kan.
1986).
105. E.g., Washington v. Electrical Joint Apprenticeship and Transp. Comm. of
Northern Ind., 845 F.2d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 1988).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
108. E.g., Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 333-34 (4th Cir.
1983).
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ity employees because of exposure to disparate impact liability
through action in which employees have an unfair advantages is
inconsistent with reality.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
the power to bring such discrimination cases. Furthermore, the
EEOC has access to employer statistical reports and statistical
experts. If it brings an action, the employer can expect that substantial defense costs will result. But as a litigation agency, the
EEOC is a paper tiger. Its resources allow it to bring only a
handful of cases. The Chicago District office of the EEOC received
4462 charges of discrimination in 1995,109 but it initiated only
thirty lawsuits, of which sixteen were individual complaints and
fourteen were class complaints."'
On the other side of the coin, Title VII has always prohibited
racial quotas in express terms."' Since 1976, white victims of
"reverse" discrimination have had a cause of action under the
statute, which prohibits all employment decisions made "because
of" race." 2 Courts have permitted race conscious employment
practices only to remedy a demonstrable history of discrimination.
Even then, courts allow the remedy for only a limited period of
time."3
Sometimes employers do specifically hire or advance minority
employees in significant numbers in order to avoid liability in discrimination cases. This practice is wrong. Title VII cannot be
blamed for this "chicken little" phenomenon. Employers do so in
part due to the inaccurate characterization of Title VII that Professor Epstein makes. Because of the high costs associated with
Title VII cases, employers seek to minimize all risks of liability.
Employers may also want to "keep up with the Joneses" to receive
recognition as good corporate citizens.
Mostly, when employers give illegal preference to minorities,
they do so because the statistics are handy and helpful persuaders
in the much more common individual discrimination cases that
might be asserted. The employer hopes the statistics will show
that the employer likely did not have a racial motive for an employment decision. The strategy is misguided, however, since
statistics alone are never determinative."" The real problem is

109. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago District Office, Internal Records (provided by Information Officer Frank Keller, Apr. 23, 1996).
110. Id.
111. "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any

employer ...

to grant preferential treatment to any individual or any group be-

cause of the race ...

of such individual or group.... ." 42 U.S.C. § 20002-2(j).

112. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285 (1976).
113. Sheet Metal Workers Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 444 (1986); Davis v.
City of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1989).

114. E.g., Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1253 n.8 (7th Cir. 1990);
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that the circumstantial evidence motive test for discrimination in
disparate treatment cases is so vague and uncertain that an employer seeking to minimize that risk has no easy way to do so.
Courts should replace this "motive" test for discrimination with a
more predictable and reasonable test which might well reduce the
frequency of this illegal practice.
VI.

REAL LIFE UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS:

MOTIVE TESTS, THE BENEFIT OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND
POINTLESS ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

While relatively few employers experience (statistical) disparate impact cases, a great many have experienced charges of disparate discrimination and lawsuits by individual employees. The
motive test used in disparate treatment individual discrimination
cases assumes that discrimination is always conscious and intentional. Personal reflection about the assumptions and expectations
that automatically leap to mind when we meet a person of a different race suggests people who are not overt race haters may
practice discrimination. Personal reflection should also explain
that few employment decisions are made for a single reason. Most
decisions are the product of a number of considerations.
Anyone genuinely concerned with the costs and inefficiencies
of the employment discrimination laws should focus on these
cases. My experience in representing both employers and employees has been that there is a real need for reform. The problem is
that the vagueness of the tests for discrimination drives up the
time and money needed to resolve these cases. The culprits are
the motive test for discrimination and the generally pointless
administrative proceedings EEOC state agencies require. Both
my employer clients and employee clients complain most about
how Title VII either allows exposure to liability for manifestly
reasonable decisions or does not create liability for manifestly
arbitrary decisions. At the same time, I have observed that the
most visible salutary effect of Title VII has been the way employers have, with increasing regularity, responded to this and
other charges in employment law by using an independent internal review of decisions before they are made to ensure that their
decisions are reasonable. My suggestion is to play to this strength
in modifying the test for Title VII liability.
A. The Misguided Effects of the Motive Test for Discrimination
The motive test favors plaintiffs by entertaining a presumption of discriminatory motive when the employer's reason or rea-

Bush v. Commonwealth Edison, 778 F. Supp. 1436, 1444 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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sons for a decision are not the "real reason" for the decision. As
presently applied, however, the motive test offers skillful defense
counsel a fairly easy opportunity to defend the employer's decision. In the absence of a racist statement by a decision maker, the
defense counsel need only formulate a reason that cannot be contradicted by the evidence. Take the case of an employee fired for
stealing. Under the motive test, the employer would be foolish to
give this as the reason, because if the employee proves he or she
was not responsible for the loss, the employer's reason may easily
be called a pretext for discrimination, as it well may be. Rather,
counsel will offer an explanation such as "loss of money under
suspicious circumstances." If no proof of theft emerges, the employer can easily say that it simply made a mistake because the
exculpatory evidence was not available at the time the decision
was made. The employer is thus not liable because the reason
given is not demonstratively false.
But the reality may well be that the manager jumped to
conclusions because the employee was an African American. If
the employee was not in fact guilty of theft, Title VII does not
require the employer to take the employee back to correct the mistake. The result is a termination that should never have happened is upheld, and where the stereotype of the dishonest black
is the reason, that is bad social policy. Since we cannot reliably
determine whether race was or was not the reason, I propose that
we order reinstatement of that employee, since the employer has
no good reason not to bring the employee back.
Allowing an easy escape for employers was not the original
idea of Congress when it enacted Title VII. While Congress sometimes spoke of intent, it relied equally on the notion that instead
of considering race, employers should rely on merit to make decisions. After the adoption of Title VII, the idea that the court
should consider, let alone rely upon, the merit or business wisdom
of a decision has virtually disappeared from the picture.
B. The Evolution of DisparateTreatment into a Motive Test
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green,"5 the Supreme Court took
its first stab at defining discrimination in the context of an individual employee case. The Court held that a plaintiff may show a
prima facie" 6 case of discrimination in hiring by proving that
the employee was qualified for the position, applied for an open
position and was rejected. The employer may rebut this by prov-

115. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

116. In tort law, "Ipirima facie evidence, if not rebutted, is conclusive." J.D. LEE
& BARRY A. LINDAHI,, I MOiDEIN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & LITIGATION § 15.10, at
503 (rev. ed. 1994).
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ing a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its decision. Upon
such a showing by the employer, the burden shifts back to the
employee to prove that the reason offered by the employer was a
"pretext," or not the real reason for the decision. In McDonnell
Douglas, the employee's conduct" 7 was obviously a legitimate
reason for the decision. Thus, the focus of the case was whether
and how the employee could prove pretext.
The Court changed this model in Furnco Construction Co. v.
Waters,"' which held that prima facie did not mean prima facie.
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the only issue was employer
motive and changed the "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason"
stage of the test from that of an affirmative defense to a virtually
non-existent burden of production on the employer of "articulating" a reason." 9 Lower courts 2 ' and subsequent decisions by
the Supreme Court 2 ' have confirmed this motive theory.
Under this pure motive theory, an employer can offer several
reasons and, if even one of them is not pretextual, the employer
' The employer can even prevail if it withholds the true
wins. "22
reason out of embarrassment even though the true reason is not
race. "23
' Anything other than race, no matter how mistaken, unas a "legitimate, nondiscriminafair or unreasonable, can qualify
24
tory reason" for a decision.
The employee's only response must be to show pretext, and
the effort is always made. But judges resist finding liability for
intelligent decisions, even where there is evidence of pretext.
They worry, too, about juries finding liability for clearly unwise
decisions for that reason, rather than because of discrimination.
As a result, they have perverted the procedural rule against deciding questions of fact. In recent years, judges have increasingly

117. The employee, with others, illegally stalled and locked his car on the main
road leading to the plant entrance in order to tie up traffic at the time of the morning shift change as a protest. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794-95.
118. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-78 (1978).
119. Id. at 578.
120. E.g., Davis v. Lambert of Ark. 781 F.2d 658, 660 (8th Cir. 1986); Monroe v.
United Airlines, Inc., 776 F.2d 394, 403 (7th Cir. 1984).
121. See generally St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
122. E.g., Germane v. Heckler, 804 F.2d 366, 368 (7th Cir. 1986).
123. Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health & Dev. Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146,
148-49 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Mason v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361,
366-67 (7th Cir. 1983) (possibility that employer's reasons are phoney insufficient
to prove pretext for discrimination).
124. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1709 (1993) (treating unlawful
reason as legitimate); see also Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559
(7th Cir. 1987) (holding that an unfounded belief honestly described precluded
liability).
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decided disputed questions of fact at the summary judgment stage
rather than allowing the cases to go to trial. 12 5 These decisions
are increasingly in the direction of finding no liability, but they
are also very hard to predict.
Why did the Court adopt the motive test? One reasonable
explanation is that mostly white judges made the law. We all tend
to judge the actions of others towards us on the basis of what
others do, yet judge our own actions towards others on the basis
of our intentions. Judges and lawyers tend to identify with the
employer, who is almost always white. A basic skepticism toward
claims of discrimination and a strong belief in the wisdom of employers in making decisions about employees have no doubt also
contributed to the increased protection of employers from the
rigors of trial in recent years.
C. The Harmful Effects of the Overly Vague Motive Test
This emphasis on intent has caused much mischief. The litigation costs of these cases are made much more expensive. Both
sides scrutinize the details of the decision and build the record to
seek out inconsistencies in the decision maker's testimony. This
means extensive document discovery and multiple depositions,
along with the attendant motion practice, all of which entails tens
of thousands of dollars in legal fees on both sides, and months or
years of delay. The case eventually turns upon whether the court
believes the decision maker's protestations of mental innocence or
not. The jury trials most often last for at least one week as the
lawyers plow through the minutiae of the decision making process
seeking to determine why the decision maker reached the conclusion he or she did. Oddly, the employee's counsel generally seeks
to make points with the trier of fact about the lack of merit of the
decision. Counsel usually offers these points as part of a pretext
showing on the theory that the decision was so foolish that race
must have been the "real" basis of the decision.
As a result of this attention to detail, a decision that might
be objectively reasonable on its face can become the basis for a
finding of liability where the decision maker simply stumbles
while trying to explain the decision. By the same token, a minority employee who has plainly been treated shabbily and stupidly in
a particular case will nevertheless have no remedy because the
evidence does not clearly show the employer based the decision on
race. In light of the status of African Americans in our economy
and society, this system makes no sense and is bad policy.

125. See Kotarski v. Binks Mfg. Co., 537 F. Supp. 247, 251-52 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(accepting employers overall conclusion about plaintiffs performance and thereby
finding no genuine issue of fact).
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Most importantly for employers, every decision, no matter
how clearly correct it is from a business standpoint, is subject to a
challenge as motivated by discrimination. Except for deciding
layoffs by seniority, employers do not have any safe harbors that
will allow dismissal of cases where a decision was manifestly
correct without a great deal of expensive discovery. In fact, the
more sound the decision appears, the more expensive the discovery will be because plaintiffs counsel will scorch the earth with
document requests, interrogatories and depositions hoping
something will support an attack on the bona-fides of the decision.
Thus, employers need a change in the system as well as
employees. What I suggest is that the employer's burden be to
affirmatively prove that its decision was a sound and consistent
business decision. The employee could attack the decision as
being pretextual, but that burden would increase substantially
depending upon how compelling the employer's business reason
was. The employer's proof would have to meet an objective test
and the "I made a stupid mistake" defense would disappear. Such
mistakes should be corrected.
Employers, employees and society as a whole would benefit if
we made the validity of the business reasons for a decision the
central focus of the case. A jury, and even a judge, cannot be unaffected in deciding the case if it appears that the decision was
stupid or wise as a matter of business judgment. An occasional
case might occur where so much racial malevolence or an established pattern of inconsistencies in treatment of races would create a question about a good, sensible and truly "legitimate" reason
for the employment decision. In most instances, however, these
cases would result in a decision as the framers of the statute expected it would: one based on whether the decision was meritorious. Employers could more frequently obtain summary resolution
of the suit without extensive discovery and the perversion of having factual issues decided by judges. No longer would minority
employees leave courts without a remedy as the judge laments
that, "While the decision was unfair to you, and based on a stupid
mistake by management, you have not proven that the decision
was motivated by your race."
D. Employers' Response to the Current System
Many employers have responded to Title VII by reviewing
decisions to determine whether they are vulnerable to an attack
on reasonableness grounds. As a general rule, the individual cases
most subject to an attack involve poor management practices that
could be characterized as discriminatory. For instance, every experienced employment lawyer has encountered an employer who
wanted a legal green light to fire an employee for poor performance where the employee had a long series of favorable perfor-
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mance evaluations in the personnel file. These favorable evaluations usually happen because the employee's manager was too
lazy or fearful of confrontation to give an honest evaluation. The
discharge decision is generally the consequence of a new boss or
pent-up frustration. Whatever performance problems the employer
offers as an explanation for the decision appear to be pretextual
even though discrimination might not have played a part in the
decision to fire the employee. As a result of this situation, employers increasingly have hired skilled professionals in human resource positions who police managers and force them to evaluate
employees honestly. These honest evaluations in turn have allowed employers to make better employment decisions.
When an employer prepares to make a discharge decision, it
knows that independent review of the decision, without unswerving loyalty to the chain of command, can head off a decision
that could lead to liability. 126 The final decision about who gets

fired and who gets promoted is then more intelligent and less
impulsive. Thus, while employees actually challenge a relatively
small percentage of employment decisions, the effect of the statute
has been to make employment decisions more well-considered.
Executives rarely complain about taking these steps, which have
led to better management. They complain about the high cost of
litigation which mainly results from the unpredictable results of
the motive inquiry.
E. The Need to Reform the Administrative Process

Another aspect of Title VII that Congress should reform is
the administrative process. In Illinois, a complainant must file
claims of discrimination in the EEOC 127 or the Illinois Department of Human Rights.12 s Neither agency, however, has the
power to adjudicate employment disputes of private sector employees. 12 In every case, the agency requests a position statement.. and usually poses something similar to interrogatories
and a request to produce documents to the employer.13 1 The process of responding to these requests is time consuming and costly.
The exercise is usually pointless. The EEOC may file suit for
the employee, but as the statistics related above show, it almost
never does. The employee, though, may always bring a de novo

126. E.g., Melnyk v. Adria Lab., Div. of Ebramont, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 301, 315
(W.D.N.Y. 1992).

127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
128. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A) (1993).
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(f).
130. Eq. Empl. Compl. Man. (Callaghan) § 22.2 T 802 (1991); 775 ILCS 5/7A102(B) (1993).
131. Id.
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action in federal court, regardless of the EEOC's determination.132 In the state system, the Department of Human Rights is
presently so backlogged and strapped for resources that it frequently does not assign an investigator within a year and rarely
reaches a conclusion within that time. Under the Illinois statute,
the employee may bypass the Department of Human Rights investigation by filing for a hearing with the Illinois Human Rights
Commission during
a one month window period about a year after
133
the initial charge.
No one benefits from this "investigation." The employee endures a pointless delay in obtaining either closure of the dispute
or a remedy. The employer must go through the exercise all over
again during discovery if proceedings progress to the federal court
or Human Rights Commission. Surely, a better and more expeditious way exists to resolve these disputes without enduring an
investigation that generally has no impact on the outcome of the
charge and simply delays the case for a year or more. For example, the parties could be given the option of either stipulating to a
quick, no discovery hearing where a decision would be reached, or
proceed to full blown litigation.
Other areas where discrimination laws could be modified to
reduce costs without eliminating the protections they provide
certainly exist. Reasonable people could disagree over which reforms are wise and which are not. This is another debate for another time. It is not what Professor Epstein is talking about.
CONCLUSION: THE IMMORALITY OF DOING NOTHING

By encouraging the legalization of all forms of discrimination
by private employers, Professor Epstein urges us to do nothing
about one of the most significant social problems of our day. For
all but the most dogmatic believers in the wonders of the free
market, his solution is wrong because it is counterintuitive. What
happens in our own lives when we operate on the theory that the
big problems in our lives will go away if we would simply ignore
them? Sometimes the problems go away, but usually things go
from bad to worse.
Believers in laissez-faire like Professor Epstein must deal
with history. The policy of unregulated free markets was the policy of our national government and, indeed, was the constitutional
13 4
law from the dawn of the Industrial Age until the New Deal.

132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
133. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(G)(2) (1993).
134. See generally Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936),
overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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The late nineteenth century, a time when industry was almost
completely free of all government regulation, was also a time of
repeated panics and tremendous economic instability." 5 Less
affluent Americans paid a huge price in hardship for that policy, 136 while the rich and powerful exploited the poor and helpless. "37
' The conditions during the great depression that led to
the present welfare state would certainly have threatened the
very survival of democratic government had laissez-faire continued as a government policy. Thus, history proves that a policy of
laissez-faire is not the panacea that Professor Epstein contends it
is. Regulation of business, beyond the minimal "force and fraud"
test he advocates, is necessary.
Consider the play "An Inspector Calls," 38 set in the early
twentieth century. A police inspector interrupts an upper class
British family as they happily celebrate their daughter's engagement to a young man with fine prospects. The inspector informs
them that a penniless and pregnant young woman has died by
suicide and that he is investigating her death. No one in the family knows the woman by name, but the inspector has the young
woman's diary. Each family member, in turn, recognizes her by a
different alias that she used.
The father, a factory owner, fired the woman because she was
a troublemaker, attempting to organize her co-workers to demand
a raise in pay. The woman then obtained a job in a dress shop.
Later, the daughter, in a fit of jealousy, insisted that the shop fire
the woman because a particular dress did not look good on the
daughter, but looked wonderful when the woman tried it on.
The young woman's next stop was a salon where prostitutes
often plied their trade. The daughter's fiance had encountered the
woman when he went to the salon. He befriended the young woman and fell in love with her. He ended their relationship because
of class differences. Again left without support or work, the woman returned to the salon. The son of the family then encountered
and took up with her. He embezzled money from his father's business to support her after he impregnated the woman. When the
young woman discovered that the son used stolen money to support her, she left and refused to see him again.
Finally, in a desperate state, the woman sought assistance
from a prominent charity. Because she was carrying the child of
the son of the family, she used his name as her latest alias. The
mother was an influential leader of the charity. Angry that the

135. GREG DAVIDSON & PAUL DAVIDSON, ECONOMICS FOR A CILIZED SOCIETY

96-97 (1988).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. J.B. PRIESTLEY, AN INSPECTOR CALLS (1945).

1996]

Debating Employment DiscriminationLaws

young woman used her own name, the mother made sure that the
young woman did not receive assistance. Shortly thereafter, the
woman committed suicide.
The story is a parable about the responsibility that each
member of a society has for every other member and the disastrous consequences that result from abdication of that responsibility. The story addresses the same moral problem that Professor
Epstein's call for abolition of the employment discrimination laws
presents. Like some of the family members, Professor Epstein
insists that we all would benefit in a world where none of us had
any responsibility towards anyone else. His call for abolition of
the employment discrimination laws is a call for eliminating all
employment regulation, from minimum wage and collective bargaining statutes to child labor laws and family and medical leave
legislation.
Few of us can watch "An Inspector Calls" and adopt the view
some of the family members take, absolving themselves of moral
responsibility for the young woman's death. Something within
each of us tells us we are connected to others in society and have
some responsibility for the plight of others.
Professor Epstein recognizes that a consensus favors laws
against employment discrimination.13 9 This consensus is based
on the idea that racism is not something to be practiced openly or
supported publicly. This idea represents a remarkable change in
public attitude in only a generation or two. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 played and continues to play an important part in forming
and maintaining that consensus. The persistence of black poverty
is one factor that prompts many whites to question this consensus
out of a sense of despair. In suggesting that society do nothing,
Professor Epstein plays on that despair and may unwittingly lend
legitimacy to those who would turn back the clock in order to promote racism.
Professor Epstein theorizes a salutary effect of the free market on employment discrimination. In my eighteen years of practicing employment law representing both employees and employers, I have seen instances in which the employment discrimination laws did not work as I wished, and also instances in which
they have prevented discrimination or brought relief when it had
occurred. I have never seen racism in the employment setting
being restrained by the operation of free market economics.
Professor Epstein underestimates the power of racism. For
fifty years, various ethnic groups lived side by side in Yugoslavia,
coexisted peacefully and often had friendly relations. In the past
several years, the world has seen the grossest of atrocities in the

139. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 577, 584.
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former Yugoslavia 40 growing out of that most irrational of hatreds: racism. Jewish history also testifies to the malevolent power of racism generation after generation over thousands of
years. 4 1 Professor Epstein should recognize that even within his
own theoretical structure racism belongs with "force and fraud" as
a form of anti-social behavior requiring the government to protect
its citizens.
There is another invisible hand, one more potent than the
one Professor Epstein relies upon, which has been effective in
combating racism. It is the power that called a washed up politician out of Springfield, Illinois to insist, "A house divided against
itself cannot stand,"
leading America to reject the moral
abomination of Black slavery despite the many thousands of lives
it cost. It is the power that called a young preacher out of Montgomery, Alabama to intone, "Let justice roll down like waters,""' leading a remarkable, peaceful revolution in law and
public attitude.
Reflecting on those times, the outcome now seems so certain.
At the time, the end results were not at all so clear. Many voices
feared the changing of the status quo. Many more voices counselled delay. Change happened because that power moved in the
hearts of the people and challenged political leaders to exercise
moral courage and leadership. I pray that this power will continue
to move in our hearts until this sad subject no longer requires
consideration, until racism becomes a relic of the past and until
Title VII suits are a curiosity from a bygone era. That day may be
far off, but it may be sooner than we could dare hope. Only then
will America have any reason to repeal the employment discrimination laws.
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